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Abstract—Although cloud computing has made great inroads
in terms of consumer adoption, we argue that the paradigm still
has a long way to go to reach an economically efﬁcient free
market state. We highlight four key problems with the current
cloud computing approach. These are (1) coarse granularity of
service provision, (2) limited control of resources, (3) inadequate
support for small providers and prosumers, and (4) vendor lockin
via APIs. In this position paper, we brieﬂy outline interesting
work that may lead to a solution, in terms of moving towards a
more market-based approach to cloud resource allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Big data and ubiquitous computing systems are built upon
the foundation of cloud computing, which is now a well-
established concept [1]. Industry investment in cloud is worth
tens of billions of dollars per annum [2], [3]. A recent
enterprise survey [4] shows that 68% of companies currently
host less than 20% of their application portfolios in the cloud,
so there is still massive scope for increased cloud adoption.
In this paper, we argue that the computing industry has not
yet realized the full potential of the cloud computing model for
service provision and delivery. We outline four problems with
cloud computing that prevent its full adoption in a sustainable
society driven by big data. Ideally, a free market for cloud
is the desirable scenario. However the problems outlined in
Section II are impediments to a free market. Brieﬂy, these are:
1) service provision is insufﬁciently ﬁne-grained.
2) a restricted subset of resources is virtualized.
3) micro-cloud providers are unable to enter the market.
4) the range of cloud platforms is heterogeneous and
broadly incompatible.
We generally focus on infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS)
cloud computing since this is where we have most experience.
Nonetheless we expect that similar arguments will apply to
other levels of utility computing provision. In Section III we
sketch out some directions for future research in this area.
II. PARADIGM PROBLEMS
This section considers four issues with current cloud com-
puting provision. We argue that these and similar problems are
preventing the establishment and efﬁcient operation of a free
market economy for cloud services.
A. Coarse Granularity of Resources
In terms of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provision,
most providers offer predeﬁned, quantized units of computing
resource. For example, the lowest speciﬁcation of an Amazon
Web Services (AWS) instance is currently t2.micro which
features a single virtual CPU and 1 GB RAM [5]. Although the
CPU bursting concept allows some rewards for unused CPU
cycles, the rewards can only be claimed in terms of subsequent
processing, rather than refunds or cheaper pricing.
Another quantized unit is the minimum time period for
which instances can be commissioned. AWS customers must
rent machines by the hour. Google Compute Engine customers
are charged for at least 10 minutes. Although there are some
more light-weight services, e.g. the asynchronous event-based
AWS Lambda platform, such innovations are not as ﬂexible
and are not yet commonplace.
This quantization of service is inefﬁcient, in terms of
market economics. Very often, consumers will pay for more
provision than they actually require. Another disadvantage is
that any kind of statistical analysis, modeling or forecasting
for computing requirements is less straightforward with non-
continuous parameters.
Finally, the different instance types hinder fair comparison.
Often, it is not possible to make direct comparisons between
different IaaS providers since they are offering products that
are neither precisely equivalent nor directly comparable.
B. Limited Provision and Control of Resources
In addition to limited granularity of resources, providers
generally offer only a limited set of resources that can be
provisioned and controlled. Compute resources and memory
can easily be provisioned, and some platforms offer the ability
to provision GPU or storage resources, but options to provision
the network access tend to be severely limited. That is, cloud
providers tend to virtualize compute, memory, and storage
resources, but offer no real access to virtualized network
services.
This makes it difﬁcult, for example, to run applications
that are sensitive to network latency and/or jitter in cloud
environments, since there is generally no way to request quality
of service measures be employed.
Similarly, despite massive investment and research into
improving data centre network protocols, and provision of
software deﬁned networking infrastructure to ease management
and improve control over resources, it is not generally possible
for clients of a cloud computing service to access these new
features. Protocol changes and virtualized SDN resources are
limited to cloud providers, and not made available to cus-
tomers. We need visibility into the software-deﬁned network,
to allow conﬁguration of network services, and to enable a
market for network service differentiation and network func-
tion virtualisation in the cloud.
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C. Exclusion of Small Providers
According to a recent industrial survey [6] the big four
providers of compute infrastructure, (Amazon, Microsoft,
Google, IBM) control over 50% of the cloud market.
In terms of physical requirements, there is a great deal
of overhead in building and maintaining a datacenter [7]. Sig-
niﬁcant costs include physical infrastructure such as electricity
and cooling, but also costs for managing compute, storage, and
network resources, and security. Potentially unexpected costs
include compliance with ISO certiﬁcation standards for cloud
security.
These signiﬁcant barriers to entry prevent small providers
from participating in the cloud service provision market. Initia-
tives such as the Open Compute Project www.opencompute.
org help, by sharing data centre designs and best practices
across providers and (somewhat) lowering the barrier to entry,
and software platforms such as OpenStack www.openstack.org
and OpenDaylight www.opendaylight.org ease deployment and
manageability, but there is still a massive infrastructure over-
head and deployment cost.
Meaningful innovation is occurring in the micro datacenter
ﬁeld, e.g. Raspberry Pi clusters [8] and clouds [9], [10],
[11]. However it is unlikely that such new technology will
be adopted by the market as it presently stands.
A further feature of a free market is the existence of
prosumers. These are individual who, at different times, buy
(i.e. they are consumers) and sell (i.e. they are producers) in the
market. In terms of cloud computing, these prosumers are end-
users who contribute compute cycles. There is a precedent for
this in terms of distributed research projects like BOINC [12].
Generally, volunteer computing is more closely associated with
grid rather than cloud technologies. However it may also be
applicable to consumer clouds, given the scope of available
resource [13]. There are clear parallels with the electricity
utility market. Electricity prosumers may have solar panel
installations that feed energy back into the grid. In terms of
cloud computing, there is no practicable technique to harness
this massively distributed small-scale prosumer behaviour at
present.
In the long term, the entry of small providers and pro-
sumers to the market will require some kind of arbitration
or cloud brokerage service. While brokerages exist currently
(e.g. Cloudaroo, RightScale) they are entirely focused on major
service providers and do not support prosumers in any way.
Grid broker services [14] for eScience applications are much
more ﬂexible and feature discovery-based protocols for service
provision.
D. Incompatibility of Platform Utilities
Each of the major cloud service providers presents its
own custom APIs and functionality for major application-level
support. Typical features include key/value storage, database
and outgoing email. There are few cloud industry standards, so
all vendors offer their own, mutually incompatible, APIs. This
problematic scenario quickly leads to vendor lockin for cloud
users. Any kind of software investment built on a commercial
IaaS platform will have vendor-speciﬁc assumptions and de-
pendences. Ideally, a vendor-neutral cloud facade [15] would
address this difﬁculty. Although some facade-style solutions
are available (e.g. Apache libcloud [16] or DeltaCloud [17])
none is widely adopted by customers or supported by all cloud
providers. In the same way as operating systems have the
concept of POSIX compliance, we need something similar for
IaaS providers. This would make it easy to migrate services
dynamically from one provider to another, based on ﬂuctuating
demand, prices and other higher level non-functional con-
cerns. Initiatives such as Nuxi CloudABI [18] have potential
here, since they provide a reasonably familiar programming
interface, cut-down to essential services and augmented by a
capability-based security model that is well suited to cloud
environments.
One might argue that the lowest common denominator
across all IaaS providers, e.g. a bare-bones x86 Linux server,
might be the common facade. Then cloud customers can
build speciﬁc services on top of this standard base layer, e.g.
database, key/value store, etc. Such services could be deployed
in Docker containers, which are increasingly supported by
major vendors. However, the administration overhead for all
these services has a high cost. This means the cloud customer
actually loses many of the beneﬁts of utility computing in the
ﬁrst place (i.e. minimal setup and conﬁguration).
III. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
As cloud computing continues to develop and gain signif-
icance, the ﬁnancial and marketing aspects become ever more
important. At present, a handful of large service providers (i.e.
Amazon, Microsoft, Google and IBM) hold a majority share
of the market, each with their own set of branded products and
proprietary ecosystem. We argue that there is greater potential
beneﬁt in opening up this marketplace.
By treating IaaS cloud as a commodity and potentially
representing it by ﬁnancial instruments, it can be traded on
an exchange in similar ways to how oil is traded presently.
The rationale here is that storage or computing resources
are generic and hence organizations can exchange or trade
these, competing on price or like-for-like services on a trading
platform. This will help create more ﬂuid supply and demand
dynamics in the market and bring more competition in this
space. Sharma et al. [19] present an initial formulation and
simulation of this concept.
There are variations in how cloud services are priced and
while there are several commercial cloud marketplaces, e.g
Spot Instances and Reserved Instance Marketplace by Amazon
AWS and SpotCloud by Virtustream (now part of EMC), they
are afﬁliated and speciﬁc to each vendor respectively. This
has led to some organizations moving into this space and
creating an active exchange market for cloud services. One
such exchange for computing capacity is the Cloud Exchange
AG [20] recently launched through a joint venture between
Deutsche Bo¨rse and Zimory. This aims to standardize the way
cloud services are offered and measured on the market. It does
this by enabling multiple cloud providers to offer comparable
services on a single platform with the ability to select the cloud
servers’ location and jurisdiction.
One of the main challenges in trading utility computing
resource like a commodity on a trading platform is the lack
of industry standardization, as discussed in Section II. IaaS
providers each have different ways of processing workloads
and apply different pricing structures. Our ultimate objective
would be to be able to trade compute resource in similar
fashion as energy or oil, which is naturally equivalent despite
different suppliers. The Bo¨rse Cloud Exchange is a small step
in the right direction, however further work is required to
reach this goal. One possibility is that national governments
or international organizations may seek to regulate the utility
computing market, similarly to the energy market—to provide
a competitive market by legal means. The European Union
anti-trust ruling against Microsoft in 2004 is an analogous case.
The immediate aim, from a systems deployment perspec-
tive, is to enable dynamic scaling and allocation of cloud
infrastructure, together with a smart agent-based system that
determines where/when to purchase additional resource in the
pay-as-you-go cloud domain. This framework could evolve
into a trading platform which allows anyone to setup and start
selling cloud resource. Further, an independent rating system
or index would be required, to calculate a metric for reliability
and performance of each cloud provider operating as a seller
in the trading platform.
IV. RELATED WORK
Early research on agoric systems [21] argues that decen-
tralized market mechanisms are an effective way to manage
resources efﬁciently in large, complex distributed computing
environments. An agoric system provides means to share
knowledge and coordinate action efﬁciently. Both of these
concepts are required for effective utility computing.
In the original presentation of agoric systems, the authors
focus on specialized distributed computation activities, such
as garbage collection across trust boundaries [22]. We have
also developed simple economic models for memory manage-
ment in virtual machines [23], [24]. However broadly similar
principles should be applicable to the more general resource
management issues in IaaS cloud provision.
Many of the concepts and technologies that underlie cloud
computing have their origins in grid computing, as Barker et
al. observe [25]. Cloud may be seen as the logical convergence
of grid and peer-to-peer distributed computing [26]. Resource
management is a key component in grids—Krauter et al.
present a good taxonomic overview [27]. In their taxonomy,
some grid resource management systems feature decentralized
scheduling with predictive state estimation based on economic
pricing models. This is the style of computational resource
market we anticipate as being most useful for cloud. Buyya
[28] presents a distributed computational economy for resource
trading in grid systems, based on quality-of-service metrics.
Pal and Hui [29] construct a formal model based on
queuing theory to describe a multi-provider cloud market for
a single application type. They present an analysis of game
theoretic models to show the existence of Nash equilibria,
which can drive dynamic optimal resource allocation. We argue
that this kind of model is essential, although we would broaden
the market to multiple application types.
Jennings and Stadler [30] present a survey of resource
management for cloud computing. They highlight ﬁve research
challenges in this area, one of which involves ‘Economic Be-
haviour and Pricing Strategies’. They anticipate the application
of dynamic pricing to control demand, on the part of both
providers and users.
Recent work involves reframing cloud resource allocation
in an economic context. For instance, Sanchez et al. [31]
describe the design of a brokerage service for IaaS cloud
provision. Mashayekhy et al. [32] present an auction system,
with a simulated evaluation. We expect to extend this work for
a multi-provider cloud market with a concrete implementation.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we argue that resource management for cloud
computing is still particularly primitive. Problems include
the coarse granularity of IaaS provision, the limited control
of resources, the exclusion of small service providers and
the incompatibility of higher-level application services. Such
difﬁculties impede the development of a commodities trading
platform for IaaS resource. We outline the direction for our
research, towards a free market for IaaS resource.
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